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The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute Has No
Preemptive Power, Or Does It? Florida's
Supreme Court Holds Florida's Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Statute Unconstitutional
Franklin T. Pyle III*
I.

Introduction

On May 18, 2006, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Harden,
affirmed a Florida appellate court's 2004 decision that found Florida's
This decision is
Medicaid anti-kickback statute unconstitutional. 1
significant because it is the first time that any court has ruled that a state
anti-kickback statute is federally preempted.2 One clear impact of the
decision is that certain financial arrangements that the Florida legislature
sought to prohibit will now be permitted.3 Furthermore, the Florida
statute that the court preempted was stricter than its federal counterpart.4
Therefore, the Florida legislature's decision to punish certain
arrangements under the Medicaid program to a greater extent than the
federal law was completely undermined.5 Because state anti-kickback

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008; B.A., cum laude, Psychology and Pre-Professional Studies, University
of Notre Dame, 2004. The author would like to thank his parents, Diane and Frank, and
sister, Allison, for all of their love, support, and encouragement through the years.
1. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 495 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2097
(Apr. 23, 2007) (No. 06-770). Generally, a Medicaid anti-kickback statute prohibits any
form of payment for referring a Medicaid-eligible individual to a provider of services
reimbursed under the Medicaid program. See id at 485.
2. See id. at 492.
3. See, e.g., State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(describing the Harden defendants' method of paying for patients).
4. Compare FLA. STAT. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)
(2006).
5. Medicaid is a state-administered healthcare program generally meant to benefit
the poor.

See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND

PROBLEMS 773 (5th ed. 2004). Despite being largely questioned and criticized, the
Medicaid program is currently more expensive than Medicare. Id. at 772.
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statutes vary widely, 6 and because Harden represents the only case that
has interpreted the preemptive power of the federal anti-kickback statute,
other courts may find the Florida Supreme Court's analysis persuasive
and strike down their own state's Medicaid anti-kickback statutes.' If a
number of other states also preempt their respective state anti-kickback
statutes, our already-strained healthcare system will suffer. State antikickback statutes help to protect our limited federal resources by harshly
punishing criminal behavior to a perhaps greater extent than the federal
statute. 8
Without such state enforcement, individuals who take
advantage of the more lenient federal anti-kickback statute will squander
limited resources.
The purpose of this Comment is to explain the Florida Supreme
Court's analysis in State v. Harden, and to offer counterarguments that
courts should consider when looking to the decision as persuasive
authority. Part II of this Comment places the Harden decision in context
by summarizing the factual background, discussing both the federal antikickback statute and Florida's anti-kickback statute, and describing a
circuit split that has arisen regarding the interpretation of one of the
federal anti-kickback statute's provisions. Part III-A examines the
Florida Supreme Court's preemption analysis in detail and offers several
arguments against the analysis. These arguments include the fact that the
federal anti-kickback statute lacks preemption provisions and the idea
that the cooperative nature of the Medicaid program should create a
stronger presumption against preemption. Part III-B emphasizes the
circuit split regarding the federal anti-kickback statute's scienter
requirement discussed in Harden, and suggests a preferable uniform
standard to apply to future anti-kickback statute cases. Part III-C
critically examines the employer-employee safe harbor analysis in
Harden and the case law cited by the Florida Supreme Court. Part III-D
explains two recent Florida cases that have interpreted Harden to suggest
how persuasive the Harden decision may become. Part IV concludes by
reiterating the significance of the Harden decision and predicting its
persuasive power.

6. See infra note 145.
7. One commentator has examined other state anti-kickback statutes using the
Harden court's analytical framework, and concluded that a court would likely find the
Pennsylvania anti-kickback statute unconstitutional under Harden. See Kathryn Leaman,
Note, State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action Is, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE
23, 29 (Mar.-Apr. 2007).
8. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.23 (West 2006) (noting that Minnesota's own
anti-kickback rules may be more restrictive than the federal law and regulations).
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II.

THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE

Background

An anti-kickback statute makes it a crime to offer, pay, solicit, or
receive any form of remuneration for inducing business that is
reimbursed under a federal or state healthcare program. 9 Prior to the
State v. Harden decisions from Florida's state courts discussed infra,
only one other court had addressed the issue of whether a state antikickback statute was federally preempted. 10 In Massachusetts v. Mylan
Laboratories," the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturers argued that
Massachusetts' anti-kickback statute was federally preempted because
the statute lacked a mens rea requirement. 12 The Massachusetts district
noting that the case law
court deferred ruling on this issue, specifically
3
on the mens rea requirement is evolving.'
The fact that only one other court has addressed the question of
whether the federal anti-kickback statute preempts a state anti-kickback
statute is not surprising in light of commentary by the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) that accompanies the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and
Program Protection Act of 1987.14 In response to a comment requesting
that the OIG "clarify the relationship between the [federal anti-kickback]
statute and various State laws," the OIG broadly proclaimed that "[t]here
is no federal preemption provision under the [federal anti-kickback]
statute."'15 Additionally, the OIG noted that legal action under the federal
anti-kickback statute could still be illegal under a state anti-kickback law,
and vice versa.' 6 Until the recent Harden decision, this statement was
true.17 The facts of the case are briefly described below.
In December 2000, the State of Florida filed a nine-count
information against ten individual defendants associated with entities that
provided dental services to children. 18 The State alleged that the
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
10. See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 492 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.
2097 (Apr. 23, 2007) (No. 06-770).
11.

Mass. v. Mylan Labs., 357 F. Supp. 2d 314, 324-25 (D. Mass. 2005).

12. Id. at 325. Mylan Laboratorieswas decided after the Florida Court of Appeal's
decision and prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Harden. In support
of their argument, the defendants cited State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). Id. Mens rea is defined as "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution.., must
prove that a defendant had when committing a crime .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1006 (8th ed. 2004).
13.

See Mylan Labs., 357 F. Supp. 2d at 325.

14. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, Pub. L. No. 100-93, §14, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,957 (July 29,
1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001).
15. Id.
16.

See id.

17.
18.

See State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 483-84 (Fla. 2006). The defendants were
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defendants paid drivers a fee for each Medicaid-eligible child that the
drivers would first solicit and then transport to a Dental Express
facility. 19 The first two counts charged the defendants with racketeering
and conspiracy, and the remaining seven counts alleged Medicaid fraud
under Florida's Medicaid anti-kickback statute.2 °
One defendant, Harden, moved to dismiss the action in October
2002, and the remaining nine defendants joined Harden's motion to
dismiss shortly thereafter.2a The defendants argued that a safe harbor
listed in the federal anti-kickback statute 22 protected Dental Express'
method of paying its employees to solicit and transport children to its
facilities.23 The defendants also argued that a provision of Florida's
Medicaid statute 24 was unconstitutionally vague, and that soliciting
patients without the intent to defraud is a protected activity under the
First Amendment of the Constitution. 25 The trial court heard arguments
from each side and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in
February 2003.26
The State of Florida appealed the trial court's ruling.27 On appeal to
Florida's Court of Appeals, the State argued that Florida's anti-kickback
statute does not conflict with the federal statute and, as such, is not
preempted.2 8 In rejecting the State's argument, the appellate court
explained two significant differences between Florida's Medicaid antikickback statute and the federal statute. 29 First, the court noted that
allegedly employed by three separate corporate entities: Dental Express Dentists, Dental
Express, Inc., and Express Dental, Inc. [hereinafter "Dental Express"]. Id.
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000).
21. Harden, 873 So. 2d at 353.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2006).
23. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 484. The safe harbor cited by the defendants excludes
from the federal anti-kickback statute "any amount paid by an employer to an employee
(who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in
the provision of covered items or services." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). The
defendants argued that Florida's attempt to prosecute an activity protected by a federal
statute violates the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[the] Constitution...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
24. FLA. STAT. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000).
25. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 484. The defendants argued that "remuneration" as used
in Florida's statute is vague in the employer-employee context. Id.
26. Harden, 873 So. 2d at 353. The trial court held that Florida's Medicaid fraud
statute and the mens rea requirement from the statute were unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause and were preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (b)(3). Id. at 354. The
court also held that Florida's statute was unconstitutionally vague because denying the
right to solicit business absent the intent to defraud violates the First Amendment.
Harden, 938 So. 2d at 484. Both the appellate court and Florida's Supreme Court failed
to address the vagueness issue. Id. at 494.
27. See Harden, 873 So. 2d at 353.
28. Id. at 354.
29. Id. at 355.

THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE

2007]

Florida's anti-kickback statute contained no safe harbors akin to those
listed in the federal anti-kickback statute. 30 Because of this difference,
the Florida statute criminalized activity that the federal statute
protected.31 Next, the court noted that the federal statute's mens rea
requirement was "knowingly and willfully," 32 while the Florida statute's
mens rea requirement was only "knowingly., 33 The appellate court
concluded that the difference in mens rea requirements between the two
statutes undermined the purpose that Congress had intended in creating
the federal statute's safe harbors: to exclude certain types of payments
from being considered illegal remuneration.34
The State of Florida appealed the decision and sought review from
Florida's Supreme Court. 35 The state raised three separate arguments
before the Florida Supreme Court on appeal: (1) the Florida Medicaid
anti-kickback statute is not preempted by either the federal anti-kickback
statute or one of the listed safe harbors; (2) the federal safe harbors do
not protect a per-patient payment system like the one implemented by the
defendants; and (3) the Florida statute does not violate the First
Amendment and is not unconstitutionally vague.3 6
Before a closer examination of the Florida Supreme Court's
decision, an introduction to both the federal anti-kickback statute and
Florida's anti-kickback statute will help to better illustrate the Florida
Supreme Court's analysis, discussed infra, and its potential
ramifications. A brief description of the federal circuit split over the
"knowingly and willfully" mens rea requirement will also help to explain
the rather confusing scienter requirement discussed by the Florida
Supreme Court. Viewing the Harden decision through the lens of both
the state and federal anti-kickback statutes and the federal circuit split
will illuminate the importance of the court's decision.
A.

Overview of the FederalAnti-Kickback Statute
1.

Development of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)

Congress enacted the federal anti-kickback statute 37 as part of the
Social Security Amendments of 1972.38 Prior to 1972, the antifraud
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2006).
Harden, 873 So. 2d at 355.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
Harden, 873 So. 2d at 355. See infra Part II.B.
Harden, 873 So. 2d at 355.
State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 485 (Fla. 2006).
Id.
The statute is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329,
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section of the Social Security Act 39 regulated Medicaid fraud, and was
With the Social Security
not specific to kickback activity. 40
Amendments of 1972, however, Congress explicitly prohibited soliciting,
offering, or receiving any kickback in connection with a Medicare or
Medicaid payment. 4 A mens rea requirement did not exist, and statute
violators could be found guilty of a misdemeanor.42
Several issues regarding interpretation of the federal anti-kickback
statute arose shortly after its enactment in 1972. 43 One significant issue
that caused a split among circuit courts was what type of transaction
In order to strengthen the
constituted a kickback, bribe, or rebate."
government's ability to prosecute Medicare and Medicaid fraud, as well
as to address certain interpretation issues, Congress passed the Medicare
and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977.45 These
amendments replaced the terms kickback, bribe, and rebate with the
broader phrase "any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or
In addition, the amendments increased the maximum
rebate). 46
While expanding the
penalties available under the statute.4 7
remuneration terms and penalties, the 1977 amendments also narrowed
the federal anti-kickback statute by excluding discounts and other price
reductions disclosed to the government, as well as excluding payments
made to an employee as part of a bona fide employment relationship.48
Congress was concerned that the increased criminal penalties could

1419-20 (1972).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 408 (2006).
40. Tamsen Douglass Love, Note, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of
"Willfully" in the Medicare/ Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1029,

1035 (1997).
41. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 141920 (1972).

42. Id. The maximum penalties included a $10,000 fine, one-year imprisonment, or
both. Id.
43. See Robb DeGraw, Note, Defining "Willful" Remuneration: How Bryan v.
United States Affects the Scienter Requirement of the Medicare/MedicaidAnti-Kickback
Statute, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 271, 275 (1999) (noting issues regarding the lack of mens rea

requirement, the types of business ventures precluded by the statute, and the meaning of
terms such as "kickback" and "bribe").
44. See Love, supra note 40, at 1035. Compare United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d
1048 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that payments made to physicians who sent blood work to a
certain lab were neither bribes nor kickbacks) with United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111
(6th Cir. 1980) (holding that payments made to physicians who sent urine and blood
samples to a lab were kickbacks within the meaning of the statute).
45. Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-142, § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180-82 (1977).
46. Id.at 1180.
47. Id. A violation of the statute constituted a felony with a maximum penalty of
five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $25,000. Id.
48. Id.
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be imposed for inadvertent activity because a mens rea requirement did
not exist, and the term "any remuneration" could be construed very
broadly.4 9 Therefore, in 1980, Congress amended the federal antikickback statute by adding a mens rea requirement.50 In order to be
convicted of violating the federal anti-kickback statute after the 1980
amendment, a person must commit the violative act "knowingly and
willfully." 51 In 1987, Congress again amended the federal anti-kickback
statute to provide for statutory exceptions known as "safe harbors" for
specified transactions, 52 and also to give the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS)53 the power to exclude violators
from federal and state health programs.
In 1996, Congress amended the anti-kickback statute as part of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).5 4
With HIPAA, Congress extended the anti-kickback statute to all federal
health programs,55 strengthened penalties for healthcare fraud
violations,56 included an additional safe harbor,57 and established a fraud
and abuse control program through the OIG of the Department of Health
and Human Services. 58 To date, the OIG has listed over twenty safe
harbors in the regulation 59 that protect physicians from the statute.60
49. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, H.R. Rep. No. 96-1167, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 59, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572.
50. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat.
2599, 2625 (1980).
51. Id.
52. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, §§ 4, 14, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89, 697-98 (1987). Safe harbors protect from
prosecution specific practices that would otherwise violate the anti-kickback statute. See,
e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2005).
53. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, § 2, 101 Stat. at 680-86. Exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs is
often disastrous for practitioners. See A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraudin Montana,
61 MONT. L. REv. 175, 204 (citing Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427 (2d Cir. 1996),
in which an oncologist who was convicted for Medicaid fraud over a $ 640.88 billing
dispute lost a $825,000 per year practice).
54. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
55. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191 § 204, 110 Stat. at 1999-2000 (1996).
56. Id. §§ 211-215, 110 Stat. at 2003-2007. The HIPAA of 1997 included
provisions for mandatory exclusions from federal health programs (§ 211) and provided
minimum periods of exclusion for certain violators (§§ 212 and 214). Id.
57. Id. § 216, 110 Stat. at 2007-08.
58. Id. § 201, 110 Stat. at 1992-96. Under this section, the Department of Heath and
Human Services was given the responsibility of issuing advisory opinions and special
fraud alerts, modifying or establishing safe harbors, and issuing guidelines to carry out
the program. Id.
59. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2005).
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Once again, in 2003, Congress added new safe harbors as part of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act. 61
The OIG added the two most recent safe harbors in 2006.62
2.

Current Federal Anti-Kickback Statute

The federal anti-kickback statute prohibits knowingly and willfully
soliciting or receiving any remuneration in return for either referring an
individual for any service compensated under a federal healthcare
63
program or purchasing any item compensated under a federal program.
The statute also prohibits offering or paying any remuneration to any
person for the same reasons.64 Anyone who violates the statute can be
charged with a felony.6 5 The statute also lists a series of eight safe
harbors to which the above provisions do not apply.66
3. Circuit Split Over the Mens Rea Requirement of "Knowingly
and Willfully"
The federal courts that have interpreted the terms "knowingly and
60. Solicitation of New Safe Harbors and Special Fraud Alerts, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,186,
73,187 (Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001).
61. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2150 (2003); id. at 2213.
62. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors
for Certain Electronic Prescribing and Electronic Health Records Arrangements Under
the Anti-Kickback Statute, 71 Fed. Reg. 45110 (Aug. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 1001).
63. Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
64. Id. Commentators have summarized the federal anti-kickback statute as
containing the following three elements: (1) knowingly and willfully, (2) soliciting or
receiving remuneration, (3) to induce or in return for referrals for federally compensated
healthcare services. Tracy D. Hubbell, Amy C. Mauro & Dan Moar, Health Care Fraud,
43 AM. CRAM. L. REV. 603, 612-13 (2006).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) - 1320a-7b(b)(3)(H). The safe harbor at
issue in the Harden case excludes from the federal anti-kickback statute "any amount
paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment relationship with
such employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or services." 42 U.S.C.
The remaining safe harbors include: discounts obtained by
§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).
providers so long as the discounts arc properly disclosed; payments made by vendors to
the authorized purchasing agent of a group furnishing services so long as there is a
written contract; waiver of any coinsurance by a federally qualified health care center to
an individual who qualifies for subsidized services under the Public Health Service Act;
remuneration between a federally qualified health center and an MA pursuant to a written
agreement; and any act specified as a safe harbor by the Secretary of HHS. Id. §§ 1320a7b(b)(3)(A)-1320a-7b(b)(3)(H). These are the statutory safe harbors; there are also
regulatory safe harbors promulgated by the OIG. See, e.g., Medicare and State Health
Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors for Certain Electronic Prescribing and
Electronic Health Records Arrangements Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 71 Fed. Reg.
45110 (Aug. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001).
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willfully," both in reference to the federal anti-kickback statute and in
reference to other federal criminal statutes, are split between a
"heightened" mens rea standard and an intermediate, or "middle" mens
rea standard.6 7 A brief description of these differing standards is
necessary in order to fully understand the Florida Supreme Court's mens
rea discussion in State v. Harden.
a.

Heightened Mens Rea Standard

The Supreme Court has interpreted the word "willfully" under a
heightened mens rea requirement in reference to complex statutory
schemes, including an anti-structuring law. 6 8 In Ratzlaf the Court
concluded that "willfully" requires both knowledge of the law itself and
the specific intent to commit the crime. 69 The precedent cited by the
Court involved relatively complex statutory requirements.7 °
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the heightened mens rea standard to the
"knowingly and willfully" requirement of the federal anti-kickback
statute in Hanlester Network v. Shalala.7 The Hanlester Network was a
general partnership that had interests in three joint venture laboratories in
California.72 The partnership president marketed limited partnership
shares in the joint ventures and, consequently, several practicing
physicians working near the labs purchased these shares. 73 Smithkline
67. See DeGraw, supra note 43, at 279-87. DeGraw notes that federal courts have
interpreted "willfully" in three ways: (1) as an act done "knowingly" or "purposely"
(citing People v. Lee, 281 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1991)); (2) as an act performed with the
specific intent to commit an unlawful activity (see, e.g., United States v. Muthana, 60
F.3d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1995)); and (3) as violation of a known law (see, e.g., Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)). DeGraw, supra note 43, at 279. The second and
third of these interpretations are known as the "middle standard" and "heightened
standard," respectively. Id.
68. See Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). Structuring refers to making
bank transactions that circumvent federal bank reporting requirements. Id. at 139-40.
The statute from Ratzlaf criminalized actions that violated anti-structuring provisions as
long as those actions were performed "willfully." Id. at 140.
69. Id. at 141.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476 (6th Cir. 1991)
(involving a statute concerning the recording and reporting of monetary transactions with
foreign financial agencies). Since Ratzlaf the Supreme Court has interpreted "knowingly
and willfully" in reference to a federal firearms tracking law in Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184 (1998). The Court in Bryan rejected the Ratzlaf standard, and held that
under the willfulness requirement, "knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is
required." Id. at 196. At least one commentator has argued that the Bryan scienter
standard will substantially affect anti-kickback statute jurisprudence, but it is arguable
whether this has been the case. See Degraw, supra note 43, at 294-96.
71. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 1394.
73. Id. at 1394-95.
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BioScience Laboratories ("SKBL") also entered into a contract with the
partnership through which it agreed to provide laboratory management
services for all three joint venture laboratories in which the Network had
ownership interests. 74 Pursuant to this agreement, eighty-five to ninety
percent of tests ordered by physicians from the Hanlester laboratories
were performed at SKBL facilities. 75 The Department of Health and
Human Services argued that Hanlester, its limited partnerships, and
various officers had violated the federal anti-kickback statute because
they offered and paid remunerations to physicians who invested in the
partnerships as inducement for referrals to Hanlester laboratories.76 HHS
also argued that Hanlester violated the statute by soliciting and receiving
remuneration from SKBL in return for referrals of laboratory tests.77
The Ninth Circuit held that several of the officers did not knowingly
and willfully violate the anti-kickback statute.78 The court construed the
mens rea requirement to mean that the alleged violators: (1) knew that
the statute prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals,
and (2) performed the prohibited conduct with the specific intent to
disobey the statute. 79 Thus, as demonstrated by the Hanlester opinion,
this heightened standard places a large burden on the government to
obtain convictions under the federal anti-kickback statute because an
alleged wrongdoer must not only know the specific statute, but must also
intend to violate it. 80 The Ninth Circuit is not the only circuit that has
adopted the heightened standard. More recently, the Tenth Circuit
applied the heightened mens rea standard to the federal anti-kickback
statute in a 2000 decision. 81 In addition, a district court within the Third
Circuit applied the heightened standard to the federal anti-kickback
statute in 2004.82
b.

Intermediate Mens Rea Standard

With the exception of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and the district
court discussed supra, federal courts have generally rejected the
heightened mens rea standard, instead applying an intermediate mens rea
standard when interpreting the federal anti-kickback statute.83 In 1996,
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1395.
76. Id.
77. Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d at 1395.
78. Id. at 1400.
79. Id.
80. See DeGraw, supra note 43, at 282.
81. United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir. 2000).
82. See Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, Civil Action No. 04142, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8498 (D. N.J. Apr. 15, 2004).
83. See Degraw, supra note 43, at 283.
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the Eighth Circuit interpreted the federal statute's mens rea requirement
in United States v. Jain.84 Dr. Jain was a psychologist who operated an
outpatient therapy clinic. 85 The government charged Dr. Jain with
violating the federal anti-kickback statute because of an alleged link
between payments made to him and his volume of patient referrals.86
The Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the Hanlesteranalysis; instead, the
Eighth Circuit held that satisfying the mens rea requirement of the
federal anti-kickback statute requires that the defendant knew his
conduct was wrongful, rather than requiring that he knew his actions
violated a known legal duty.87

Similarly, in United States v. Davis, the Fifth Circuit also applied an
intermediate mens rea standard in interpreting the federal anti-kickback
statute. 88 Davis was convicted, inter alia, of violating the federal antikickback statute's prohibition against offering and paying to induce
Medicare referrals. 89 During his appeal, Davis argued that the statute
required a heightened mens rea requirement, citing Hanlester.90 The
court did not decide whether the statute required the heightened mens rea
requirement that Davis argued, and presumably misinterpreted the
Hanlester holding. 91 The Davis court read the Hanlester opinion as
requiring that the alleged wrongdoer know that the action was unlawful,
and in doing so impliedly rejected Hanlester's actual standard.92
Finally, in 1995, a district court within the Sixth Circuit cited Jain
and interpreted the term willful as the "purpose to commit a wrongful
act" in United States v. Neufeld. 93 The intermediate approach taken by
the courts in Jain, Davis, and Neufeld appears to be the majority view

84. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 438.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 441. The court in Jain distinguished Ratzlaf by stating that the antistructuring statute at issue criminalizes a willful violation of another statute, while the
word willfully in the federal anti-kickback statute merely modifies a series of prohibited
acts. Id.
88. United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1998).
89. Id. at 1094.
90. Id.
91. See id. This misinterpretation stems from the Davis court's understanding that
Hanlester does not require knowledge of which particular statute makes the conduct
illegal. Id.; Douglas A. Blair, The Knowingly and Willfully Continuum of the Antikickback Statute's Scienter Requirement: Its Origins, Complexities, and Most Recent
Judicial Developments, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 32 (1999). Hanlester does in fact

require knowledge of the specific statute in question. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala,
51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
92. Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094. See Degraw, supra note 43, at 285.
93. See United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (D. Ohio 1995). In reaching
its decision, the court cited both Ratzlaf and Hanlester, and explicitly rejected the
interpretations of "willful" from the two courts. See id. at 495-97.
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concerning interpretation of the federal anti-kickback statute's mens rea
requirement,9 4 but the Hanlester interpretation remains good law, and
may be applied not only in circuits that have followed it, but also in
circuits that have yet to rule on the issue.95
4,

Federal Anti-Kickback "Employees" Safe Harbor

Because of the extremely broad language used in the federal antikickback statute, the statute itself may cover relatively harmless financial
arrangements.9 6 To avoid criminalizing innocuous payment practices,
the OIG has promulgated over twenty safe harbors that list payment
arrangements treated as exceptions to the federal anti-kickback statute.97
Although a financial arrangement must meet each element of a safe
harbor to be deemed exempt from prosecution, a failure to fall entirely
within a safe harbor is not an automatic breach of the anti-kickback
statute. 98 In fact, commentators have suggested that most arrangements,
even those specifically created to fall within an enumerated safe harbor,
will not completely fall under a safe harbor and therefore will be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 99
One such safe harbor, which was at issue in the Harden case, is the
"Employees" safe harbor. 100 According to this safe harbor, amounts paid
by an employer to an employee in a bona fide employment relationship
for any item or service that is reimbursed under a federal health program
is not an illegal remuneration. 10 ' Determining what exactly constitutes a
"bona fide 0employment
relationship," however, is not necessarily a
2
simple task.1

94. The United States Supreme Court interpreted willfully as done "with knowledge
that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,
196 (U.S. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit applied this Bryan standard to the federal antikickback statute in United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 836 (11 th Cir. 1998).
95. See Degraw, supra note 43, at 287.
96. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Fraud and Abuse Anti-Kickback
Provision, 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001).
97. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2005).
98. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse, 64 Fed. Reg.
63,518, 63,521 (Nov. 19, 1999) ("not... every arrangement that does not comply with a
safe harbor is suspect under the anti-kickback statute").
99. See Linda A. Baumann, Navigating the New Safe Harbors to the Anti-Kickback
Statute, 12 HEALTH L. 1, 3 (2000); Lissa Bourjolly & Erin Moak, Health Care Fraud,41
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 751, 766-67 (2004).
100. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting defendants' argument regarding the existence of a bona fide employment
relationship).
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Overview of Florida'sMedicaid Anti-Kickback Statute
Florida's legislature enacted its state's anti-kickback statute in

199 1.103 The statute made it unlawful to:

Knowingly solicit, offer, pay, or receive any remuneration, including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate, directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind, in return for referring an individual to a
person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item
or service for which payment may be made, in whole or in part, under
the Medicaid program, or in return for obtaining, purchasing, leasing,
ordering, or arranging for or recommending, obtaining, purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any goods, facility, item, or service, for which
payment 104
may be made, in whole or in part, under the Medicaid
program.

At the time of enactment, Florida's Medicaid anti-kickback statute
defined "knowingly" as an act "done by a person who is aware or should
be aware of the nature of his conduct and that his conduct is substantially
certain to cause the intended result."' 10 5 Florida's anti-kickback statute
contained no safe harbors akin to those listed in the federal anti-kickback
statute.106
In response to the State v. Harden decision in 2004,107 the Florida
legislature amended Florida's Medicaid anti-kickback statute. 10 8 A mens
rea requirement of both knowingly and willfully was included within the
statutory definition of "knowingly."' 0 9 The 2004 amendment still did not
list any specific safe harbors. 1 0
C.

FederalPreemption
In 1824, the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S.

103. See 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 282, § 50 (1991).
104. FLA. STAT. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000). A violation of the statute was punishable as
a third-degree felony, which imposed a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and
a $5,000 fine. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 491 (Fla. 2006).
105. FLA. STAT. § 409.920(1)(c).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 409.920.
107.
108.
109.

State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
See 2004 Fla. Laws 344, § 8, 2392-93.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920(1)(d) (West Supp. 2007).

"Knowingly" is

defined as an act done:
voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident...
'knowingly' also includes the word 'willfully' or 'willful' which.., means that
an act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do
something that the law forbids, and that the act was committed ...either to
disobey or disregard the law.

Id.
110. See 2004 Fla. Laws 2392-93.
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Constitution's Supremacy Clause 1 ' invalidates any state law that either
interferes with or is contrary to any law passed by Congress." 12 In
analyzing a federal preemption claim, the Supreme Court historically
started with the assumption that the police powers of the states were not
to be superseded by a federal law "unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." ' 13 Since the Rice decision in 1947, however, the
preemption doctrine has undergone
frequent changes and has been the
4
subject of significant confusion. 1
Federal preemption may be either express or implied, and is
required "whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." ' 15 The
Supreme Court has recognized the following three ways in which federal
laws may preempt state laws: 1 6 (1)through express preemption, where
Congress' preemptive purpose is stated within the statutory language
itself, 117 (2) through implied field preemption, where the federal
regulation scheme is sufficiently all-encompassing that it may be inferred
that Congress did not leave any room for state regulation; 1 8 and
(3) through implied conflict preemption, 19 where either compliance with
both the federal and state regulations is physically impossible 2 ° or where

111. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. (Federal law "shall be the supreme law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
112. SeeGibbonsv. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,210-11 (1824).
113. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). But see Mary J.
Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REv. 967, 968
(2002) (arguing that while historically the Supreme Court has said that there is a
presumption against preemption, there is actually a presumption in favor of preemption).
114. See Davis, supra note 113, at 972-1013; Jennifer S. Hendricks, Preemption of
Common Law Claims and the Prospectsfor FIFRA: Justice Stevens Puts the Genie Back
in the Bottle, 15 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. F. 65, 69-79 (2004).
115. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (citing Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146-52 (2001) (holding a
Washington statute that revoked the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a
nonprobate asset upon divorce was expressly preempted by the language of ERISA).
118. See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919) (holding
that through the Safety Appliance Act and regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Congress had taken over the field of railcar construction to such an extent
that a Pennsylvania statute, which conflicted with'the Act, was impliedly preempted).
119. Some commentators have broken this implied conflict preemption category into
two separate designations, impossibility preemption and obstacle preemption, but the
principles remain the same. See Hendricks, supra note 114, at 69-70.
120. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) (holding
that an Illinois statute requiring a certain type of mudguard on trucks was preempted by
the Commerce Clause because the statute made it physically impossible to comply with
statutes in many other states).

2007)

THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE

the state regulation blocks the purposes and objectives of Congress., 2 1 In
each of these preemption analyses, a court's objective is "to determine
whether state regulation122is consistent with the structure and purpose of
the statute as a whole."'
III. Analysis
The trilogy of Florida courts that handled the Harden case were the
first courts to hold that the federal anti-kickback statute preempted a state
anti-kickback statute. 123 The most important sections of the decisions are
the preemption analysis used by the courts, the lack of consensus
regarding the federal anti-kickback statute's mens rea requirement, and
the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the employer-employee
safe harbor. Since the Harden decision from the appellate court, several
Florida courts have interpreted the appellate court's decision. 124 Two
decisions in particular may help to better explain the Harden analysis
and show how influential the preemption analysis used in Harden may
become.
A.

The Preemption Analysis Used by the Florida Courts in Harden
Could Influence Other Courts to Preempt State Anti-Kickback
Statutes as Unconstitutional

In 2004, Florida's Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's holding
that Florida's anti-kickback statute was conflict preempted and,
therefore, unconstitutional. 125 The appellate court based its finding on
two significant differences between the federal statute and Florida's antikickback statute. 2 6 First, the appellate court recognized that Florida's
anti-kickback statute lacked any safe harbors, and thus criminalized
activity that the federal anti-kickback statute protected. 127 Second, the
appellate court focused on each anti-kickback statute's mens rea
121. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (holding that a Wisconsin
notice of claims statute was federally preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the
Wisconsin statute conflicted with the purpose and effects of § 1983's remedial measures
and because the state law would produce different outcomes in § 1983 litigation).
122. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). A thorough
review of federal preemption jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Comment. Recent
preemption jurisprudence has been quite puzzling, but the general background provided
above will help explain the Harden decision. See Davis, supra note 113 at 968-72.
123. See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 491 (Fla. 2006).
124. See, e.g., State v. Wolland, 902 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); State
v. Rubio, 917 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S 464 (Fla. July 12, 2007).
125. State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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requirement and noted that Florida's "knowingly" statutory requirement
could criminalize negligent activity.1 28 Because of these two differences,
the appellate court found that Florida's anti-kickback statute stood as an
"obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
' 129
objectives of Congress."
In affirming the appellate court's decision, Florida's Supreme Court
explained its preemption analysis in more depth than the lower court. At
the outset, the court noted that the "federal anti-kickback statute does not
contain explicit preemptive language, nor does it contain such a
pervasive scheme of federal regulation so as to indicate field
preemption."'' 30
This conclusion was relatively straightforward
considering the OIG's statement that "[t]here is no federal preemption
provision under the [federal anti-kickback] statute"' 3' and the fact that
132
the Medicaid system itself is implemented in large part by the states.
The court then began its analysis under the implied conflict preemption
category, recognizing that its task was to determine whether Florida's
anti-kickback statute "is consistent with the structure and purpose of the
[federal] statute as a whole."' 133 This task involved "looking
to the
134
policy.'
and
object
its
to
and
law,
whole
the
of
provisions
After discussing the federal anti-kickback statute and its history, the
court concluded that neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals
its effect on either state anti-kickback statutes or state regulatory
schemes. 3 5 Like the appellate court, the Florida Supreme Court instead
examined statutory differences to determine whether the state and federal
laws conflicted. 36 First, the court examined the state law's mens rea
requirement. 37 The court noted that there remains a question regarding
the use of the intermediate or heightened mens rea standard as applied to
an anti-kickback statute, 38 but concluded that no federal court has yet to
apply a negligence standard akin to the standard from the Florida anti128. Id.
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 486 (Fla. 2006).
131. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,957 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001).
132. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (referring to the Medicaid
program as a "cooperative endeavor" and "cooperative federalism").
133. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 486 (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
134. Id. (citations omitted). The court also seemed to begin its analysis with a
presumption against federal preemption. See id.
135. Id. at 486-90.
136. Id.at 490.
137. Id.at491.
138. See supra Part II.A.3.
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39
kickback statute. 1

140
The court then discussed the state statute's lack of safe harbors.
In concluding that the federal anti-kickback statute preempted the state
statute, the court cited congressional concern over the fact that the
federal anti-kickback statute was broad enough to cover relatively
harmless arrangements, which led to the federal safe harbors'
enactment.' 4 ' Because the federal safe harbors protected specified
conduct that the state statute did not, the court reasoned that the Florida
lack of safe harbors stood as an obstacle to Congress'
Medicaid statute's
42

purposes. 1

Although the Harden decision only affects Florida's Medicaid antikickback statute, it could become quite influential because it remains the
only decision that has held a state anti-kickback statute was federally
preempted. Future defendants will no doubt argue that Harden's
preemption analysis should be applied to other state anti-kickback
statutes under which those defendants are charged. 43 Although the
Harden court noted that many state anti-kickback statutes were drafted to
closely follow the federal statute, 144 state anti-kickback statutes may vary
considerably. 45 State statutes that either do not contain any safe harbors
or that are broad enough to criminalize negligent conduct are particularly
vulnerable to the Harden court's preemption analysis. 46 Despite this
vulnerability, arguments exist against the Harden preemption analysis
that could diminish its persuasiveness in other courts.
The strongest argument against the Harden court's preemption
analysis is the lack of preemption provisions in the federal anti-kickback
statute or its history. The OIG, which has the power to promulgate safe
139. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 491. Unlike Florida's Supreme Court, the appellate court
applied the heightened mens rea standard from Hanlester Network. State v. Harden, 873
So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see discussion supra Part II.A.3.
140. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 491-92.
141. Id. at 491 (citing Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions & Establishment of Additional
Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,518
(Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001)).
142. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 491-92.
143. See, e.g., California, ex rel. Ven-A-Care of the Fla. Keys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc. (In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig.), 478 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179 (D.
Mass. 2007) (rejecting defendants' argument that the Massachusetts district court should
follow Harden).
144. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 491; see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-1-11(b),(c) (LexisNexis
2006).
145. See Reply Brief of Appellant State of Florida at 7-8, State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d
480 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC04-0613), 2004 WL 2387304 (explaining that the mens rea
requirement in state anti-kickback statutes varies widely); see also Leaman, supra note 7,
at 24-26 (noting that state anti-kickback statutes vary).
146. See, e.g., Leaman, supra note 7.
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harbors applicable to the federal anti-kickback statute, highlights this fact
in the statement "[t]here is no federal preemption provision under the
[federal anti-kickback] statute." 147 If there is any doubt about the OIG's
stance on this matter, one need only look to the newest safe harbors for
arrangements involving electronic prescribing and electronic health
records technology. 148 In response to a comment concerning the
preemptive power of the newest safe harbors over conflicting state laws,
the OIG reiterated the notion that federal anti-kickback law does not
preempt state anti-kickback laws. 149 Furthermore, the OIG offered an
Advisory Opinion where it stated that "[v]an drivers soliciting, and
offering free transportation services to, Medicaid patients for health care
providers who compensate the drivers on a per patient or per service
basis" is an example of an abusive arrangement involving free
transportation.1 50 It therefore appears that not only does the federal antikickback statute lack any cognizable preemptive power, but also that the
compensation arrangement at issue in Harden may violate the federal
anti-kickback statute.
Another argument that cuts against the Harden court's analysis is
that because Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program,' 5 1 there
should be an even stronger presumption against preemption. 5 2 The
Medicaid program is administered in large part by the states, and
Congress gave the states broad latitude in enforcing state laws
concerning Medicaid.153 Because the Florida statute was to cease the
abusive and costly practice of giving kickbacks for referrals just like the
federal statute, the Florida Supreme Court should have applied a stronger
presumption against preemption even though the Florida statute was
stricter than its federal counterpart.
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court stated that its task was to

147. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,957 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001).

148. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors
for Certain Electronic Prescribing and Electronic Health Records Arrangements Under
the Anti-Kickback Statute, 71 Fed. Reg. 45110 (Aug. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 1001).
149. Id.at45114.
150. OIG Advisory Opinion 00-7 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/advisory opinions/2000/aoOO_7.htm.
151. See supra note 132.
152. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 666 (2003)
(noting that the presumption against preemption has special force when the state statute is
designed to foster public health and both the federal and state statutes are pursuing
common purposes).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (2006).
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look at the federal anti-kickback statute as a whole,154 but the court
arguably focused solely on the structure and purpose of the safe harbor
provisions. 55 Had Florida's Supreme Court looked to the entire federal
anti-kickback statute, it may have concluded that Florida's Medicaid
anti-kickback statute was merely the state's attempt to enforce its own
fraud and abuse law, which could be considered consistent with the
general purpose of the federal statute.
B.

The FloridaSupreme Court'sRefusal to Adopt Either of the Federal
Anti-Kickback Statute's Mens Rea StandardsEmphasizes a Circuit
Split that Should Be Resolved by the United States Supreme Court

There is currently a circuit split regarding the application of the
mens rea requirement "knowingly and willfully" to the federal antikickback statute, with the majority of circuits adopting an intermediate,
or "middle standard," and a minority of circuits adopting a "heightened
standard. , 156 This split is clearly demonstrated in the Harden case
because the appellate court cited an intermediate standard from Bryan v.
United States,157 but arguably followed the heightened mens rea standard
from Hanlester Network v. Shalala. Florida's Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the split, but failed to follow either side in its analysis. 158
Although the Florida Supreme Court did not follow either of the mens
rea standards in reaching its decision, the court's discussion of the split
suggests that the time to resolve the conflict is now.
In November of 2006, the state of Florida petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari regarding the Harden
decision. 59 Although the Court denied certiorari, 60 the Court should
conclusively resolve this split in favor of a single specific mens rea
154.

See Harden, supra note 133, at 486,

155. See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 490-92 (Fla. 2006).
156. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. Some commentators do not recognize this split
as a dichotomy between standards, but rather as a continuum with Hanlester on one end
and United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), which was the first reported
case discussing the federal anti-kickback statute's scienter requirement, on the other. See
Blair, supra note 91, at 9-32.
157. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). The appellate court cited Bryan for
the proposition that "in order to establish a 'willful' violation of a statute, 'the
Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful."' State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 (citation omitted)). This proposition is very similar to the
middle standard discussed in Part II.B.3, supra.
158. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. Because the appellate court
cited Bryan right before citing Hanlester, it is not clear exactly which standard the court
applied. See State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
159. State v. Harden, No. 06-770 (Fla. filed Nov. 28, 2006).
160. State v. Harden, 127 S. Ct. 2097 (Apr. 23, 2007) (No. 06-770).
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standard for the federal anti-kickback statute. 61 When the Court
explicitly resolves the split, it should adopt the same mens rea standard
that it adopted with reference to a federal firearms trafficking statute 62 in
Bryan v. United States163 because of its similarity to the middle standard
currently followed by the majority of circuits, 164 and because the firearms
statute at issue in Bryan is similar to the federal anti-kickback statute. 65
Under the Bryan standard, "in order to establish a 'willful' violation of a
statute, 'the Government must prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."",166 While this standard
requires that a defendant act with an evil-meaning mind, acting
"knowingly and willfully" does not require knowledge of the specific
law itself.' 67 Subsequent to this decision, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the Bryan standard to the federal anti-kickback statute and in doing so
rejected its own prior heightened mens rea standard that required
knowledge of the law itself.' 68 United States v. Starks169 shows that the
Supreme Court's mens rea standard from Bryan is compatible with the
federal anti-kickback statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit split by explicitly extending Bryan to the federal antikickback statute.
Alternatively, if the Court were to adopt the heightened mens rea
standard explained in Hanlester, the federal anti-kickback statute's
purpose could be frustrated by the increased burden on government
prosecutors. Forcing the government to prove that a defendant both
knew of a specific statute and intended to violate it could "contribute
appreciably to the cost of the medicare and medicaid programs" by
allowing practices that were meant to be criminalized persist due to
prosecutorial difficulty. 70

161. Commentators have previously suggested that the Supreme Court grant certiorari
to resolve this issue in light of the numerous conflicting opinions from the Circuit Courts
of Appeals. See Blair, supra note 91, at 33-36.
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(d) (2006).
163. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
164. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
165. See Degraw, supra note 43, at 290 (describing statutory similarities including the
fact that each statute was amended to include a "willfully" mens rea requirement and
each currently includes the mens rea requirement "knowingly and willfully").
166. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92.
167. See id. at 191-99.
168. See United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838-39 (11th Cir. 1998).
169. United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (1 ith Cir. 1998).
170. H.R. Rep. No. 92-231 (1971), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093.
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The FloridaSupreme Court MisinterpretedJurisprudence
Regardingthe Employer-Employee Safe Harborby Concluding that
the Defendants' PracticeFell Under the Safe Harbor

The third significant aspect of the Harden decision is the way that
Florida's Supreme Court. analyzed .the defendants' method of paying
drivers on a per head basis under the federal employer-employee safe
harbor.17' The court began its analysis by explaining the employee safe
harbor and by quoting an OIG statement that "an employer [may] pay an
employee in whatever manner he or she [chooses] for having that
employee assist in the solicitation of program business and applied to
bona fide employee-employer relationships." 172
The court next
recognized that there are no OIG advisory opinions that address the per
head payment method used by the defendants, and that there is no case
law directly on point. 173 In concluding that the defendants' payment
method fell under the employee safe harbor, however, the court cited two
cases that applied the employee safe harbor 174 and two cases that did
not. 175 The court arguably misinterpreted the cases that it cited in
reaching the conclusion that the defendants' method of paying drivers
per head was protected by the employee safe harbor.
The court relied on United States ex rel. Obert-Hong v. Advocate
Health Care'76 and New Boston General Hospital, Inc. v. Texas
Workforce Commission' 77 to illustrate payment arrangements in which
171. This safe harbor protects payments made by an employer to a bona fide
employee. See supra Part II.B.4.
172. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 492 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 493. There is, however, an OIG Advisory Opinion that the court did not
cite, which seems to apply to the defendants' arrangement. See supra note 150 and
accompanying text. In response to a request for an opinion regarding free transportation
services, the OIG stated that an example of an abusive arrangement involving free
transportation is: "[v]an drivers soliciting, and offering free transportation services to,
Medicaid patients for health care providers who compensate the drivers on a per patient
or per service basis." Id.
174. See United States ex rel. Obert-Hong v. Advocate Health Care, 211 F. Supp. 2d
1045 (N.D. I11.
2002) (applying the safe harbor to physician-employees who were
required to refer patients to the employer hospital and who also received varying
compensation based on the value of the work performed by each individual doctor); New
Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 47 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 2001)
(applying the safe harbor to an employment relationship where a recruiter marketed her
employer's hospital to nursing homes for both a wage and a flat fee for each home that
contracted with the hospital).
175. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 493-94 (Fla. 2006) (citing United States v.
Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Polin, 194 F.3d 863 (7th Cir.
1999)).
176. United States ex rel. Obert-Hong v. Advocate Health Care, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1045
(N.D. Il1.2002).
177. New Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 47 S.W.3d 34 (Tex.
App. 2001).
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courts applied the employee safe harbor. 7 8 In Obert-Hong, the
defendant hospitals, among other things, allegedly required member
doctors to refer patients to the hospitals and also purportedly offered
bonuses based on the volume of referrals.179 The Obert-Hong court
noted that the federal anti-kickback statute is "designed to remove
economic incentives from medical referrals, not to regulate typical
hospital-physician employment relationships" and that employee
compensation, unless directly related to referrals, is exempt under the
federal employee safe harbor. 80 In discussing the alleged bonuses, the
court further noted that the arrangement fell within the safe harbor
because the bonuses "depend[ed] on the value of work performed by the
individual doctor, not the value of any referrals."' 8'
The Obert-Hong
decision illustrates two types of arrangements that do not fall within the
safe harbor: (1) arrangements that provide an economic incentive for
182
medical referrals and (2) compensation based on the value of referrals.
Applying these principles to the Harden defendants should have led the
Harden court to determine that the defendants fell outside of the
employee safe harbor because the defendant drivers had a clear economic
incentive to refer to the defendants. Furthermore, the employees 1in
83
Obert-Hong were doctors who provided "covered items or services,"'
and it is arguable
whether or not soliciting and driving patients is a
84
covered service.

New Boston provides more support for the Harden decision than
Obert-Hong,but the case is nevertheless distinguishable. In New Boston,
a Texas Court of Appeals held that an employment agreement under
which the employee was compensated for recruiting and marketing a
hospital's services to nursing homes fell within the employee safe
harbor. 85 The employee was also compensated $1,000 for each home
that she recruited. 86 Although the facts of the arrangement in New
Boston appear similar to the Harden arrangement, the cases are in fact
distinguishable. New Boston was not a criminal case where the
defendant was charged under the anti-kickback statute, but was rather8 a7
civil case where an employee sought back pay from her employer.1
178. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 493.
179. Obert-Hong,211 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49.
180. Id. at 1050.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (2006).
184. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
185. New Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 47 S.W.3d 34, 38-39
(Tex. App. 2001).
186. Id. at 35.
187. Id.
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The anti-kickback issue was raised on appeal by the employer-hospital in
an attempt to argue that the contract was unenforceable. 188 Furthermore,
the employee was not compensated to solicit individual patients, but
rather to solicit nursing homes. 189 In this context, it appears that the New
Boston employee was merely a businesswoman who received a
commission as part of her.compensation, and it is debatable whether she
had any economic incentive at all based on Medicaid referrals.
The compensation arrangement discussed in the Starks decision,
which did not apply the employee safe harbor to a physician
arrangement, is factually similar to the Harden arrangement.' 90 In
Starks, the compensation arrangement included a flat fee for each patient
that was referred to defendant Siegel's chemical dependency clinic. 191
The major difference between Starks and Harden is that the purported
"employees" who referred patients to the clinic in Starks were already
employed by a support clinic for pregnant women; therefore it was very
difficult to argue that they were bona fide employees of the defendant
Siegel. 192 Despite this difference, the arrangement is almost identical to
the Harden arrangement because of the per head fee given for referrals in
each. In fact, the Starks defendants did not argue that the employee safe
harbor applied to their arrangement, but argued instead that the safe
harbor was constitutionally vague in reference to the anti-kickback
statute. 193 In holding that the statute and the safe harbor were not
unconstitutionally vague, the Starks court specifically noted that the
referring "employees" were not even providing "covered items or
services.'' 19 4 Because the Starks arrangement is factually similar to the
Harden arrangement, it is not certain that the Harden drivers were
actually performing Medicaid-covered services; this distinction is critical
for falling within the employee safe harbor.' 95
A final issue that the Florida Supreme Court failed to analyze, but
which could have helped guide its decision, is the fact that several
circuits have adopted a "one purpose" test, holding that if one purpose of
a payment was to induce referrals compensated through Medicare or
Medicaid, the anti-kickback statute has been violated. 196 The facts of the
188. Id. at 38.
189. Id.at 39.
190. See United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 835-37 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
191. Id.at 836.
192. Id. at 836-37. The compensation arrangement in Starks also had a clandestine
quality, further undermining any argument concerning a bona fide employer-employee
relationship. See id. at 839.
193. Id. at 839-40.
194. Id. at 839.
195. See id.
196. See United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
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Harden case support the conclusion that there was one purpose of the
Harden arrangement: to induce referrals. Therefore, the one purpose
test could have been used to argue against applying the employee safe
harbor.
D.

FloridaState Courts Have Interpreted State v. Harden
Inconsistently

Although different courts have not yet had the opportunity to
interpret the State v. Harden decision from Florida's Supreme Court in
great detail, 197 Florida courts have interpreted the appellate court's
decision' 98 with conflicting results. The first Florida case interpreting
Harden was State v. Wolland, 199 decided in May 2005. In Wolland, the
defendant was charged with 115 counts of Medicaid fraud/false billing
under Florida's Medicaid Provider Fraud Statute.2 °° In a motion to
dismiss, the defendant argued that the Florida statute was
unconstitutional because federal law preempted the statute. 20 1 Applying
the appellate court's analysis explained in Harden, the trial court
concluded that the federal false claims provision 20 2 preempted Florida's
false claims provision.20 3
The Florida Court of Appeals (the same court that decided Harden),
however, reversed the trial court's holding.20 4 Like Harden, the Wolland
court recognized that the federal false claims act did not contain any
express preemptive language, and also that Congress did not intend for
the federal statute to exclusively control the false claims field. 20 5 The
Wolland court therefore examined the issue of whether Florida's false
claims statute "stands as an obstacle to the execution and
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1985).
197. See, e.g., Prosper Diagnostic Ctrs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 2069
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2007) (following Hardenbut failing to discuss the decision).
198. State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
199. State v. Wolland, 902 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). Note that
Florida's Supreme Court has since disapproved portions of Wolland that conflict with its
recent decision in State v. Rubio, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S 464 (Fla. July 12, 2007).
200. Id. at 279-80; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920(2)(a) (West 2004). Florida's Medicaid
Provider Fraud statute provided in pertinent part: "(2) It is unlawful to: (a) Knowingly
make, cause to be made, or aid and abet in the making of any false statement or false
representation of a material fact, by commission or omission, in any claim submitted to
the agency or its fiscal agent for payment." Id.
201. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 280. While the Florida statute made it a crime to
knowingly make and false statement, the mens rea requirement from 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(a) was knowingly and willfully. See id.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006).
203.

Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 281; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920(2)(a).

204.
205.

Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 281.
Id. at 282.
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accomplishment of the objectives and goals of Congress," and found that
it did not.2 °6
In holding that the Florida statute was not federally preempted, the
court first applied a strong presumption against preemption because the
federal and Florida false claims provisions share common goals. 20 7 Next,
the court recognized that false claims are frequently asserted under the
Federal False Claims Act, 20 8 which does not contain a willfulness mens
rea. 20 9 In distinguishing Harden, the court stated that Harden turned on
the absence of safe harbors in the Florida anti-kickback statute, therefore
the Harden analysis is limited to the facts of that case.21 °
The next case interpreting Harden was State v. Rubio,211 decided in
December 2005 by a Florida appellate court. In Rubio, five defendants
were accused of, inter alia, violating Florida's Medicaid provider fraud
statute 1 2 and Florida's patient brokering statute. 1 3 These accusations
arose from an arrangement through which two of the defendants solicited
and transported Medicaid-eligible children from public housing areas to
the clinics of two other defendant dentists.21 4 The dentists would then
split the fee received for each child with the person who transported the
child. 21 5 The defendants moved to dismiss the Medicaid provider fraud
statute counts on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional, and also
moved to dismiss the patient brokering statute counts on the ground that
the statute criminalizes any fee-splitting arrangement without regard to
mens rea.216 The trial court agreed with both of these arguments and held
that both Florida statutes were unconstitutional.2 7
The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that
Florida's Medicaid provider fraud statute was federally preempted.21 8
After thoroughly reviewing the Harden and Wolland appellate decisions,
the court disagreed with the Wolland decision, holding that one cannot

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
209. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 282-83.
210. Id. at 286.
211. State v. Rubio, 917 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part,and remanded, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S 464 (Fla. July 12, 2007).
212.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920(2)(a) (West 2004).

213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.505 (West 2004). The patient brokering statute makes
fee-splitting for inducing the referral of patients to any healthcare provider illegal (and
thus is not specific to federally reimbursed healthcare providers). Id.
214. Rubio, 917 So. 2d at 387.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 388.
217. 1d.

218. Id. at 392.
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negligently make a false statement. 1 9 Instead, the Rubio court followed
the Harden analysis and held that Florida's false statement statute
"conflicts with federal law just as much as the anti-kickback
provision.', 22 0 Like Harden, the Rubio appellate court found that because
Florida's false statement statute criminalized actions that the federal
counterpart did not, the statute stood as an obstacle to the objectives and
purposes of the Medicaid program. 22
The appellate court in Rubio,
however, overturned the trial court's holding that Florida's patient
brokering statute was unconstitutional.2 22 The defendants argued that the
patient brokering statute was in effect an anti-kickback statute and,
therefore, must contain a willfulness requirement. 223 Rejecting the
defendants' argument, the court cited Wolland and explained that Harden
was based primarily on a lack of safe harbors in the Florida antikickback, but the patient brokering statute contains safe harbors. 4
From these two Florida appellate court decisions, it is clear that
Florida courts viewed the Florida anti-kickback statute's lack of safe
harbors as the deciding factor in the Harden appellate court decision.225
Furthermore, Wolland construed the Harden analysis very narrowly,
limiting the decision to the specific facts of the Harden case.226 These
two decisions demonstrate that Florida courts have found it difficult to
apply Harden'spreemption analysis to similar healthcare fraud statutes.
Although the Florida Supreme Court attempted to clarify its Harden
decision in State v. Rubio in July 2007, the Rubio and Wolland decisions
from Florida appellate courts illustrate the difficulty that applying the
Harden framework entails. Because state Medicaid anti-kickback
statutes vary broadly, Wolland and Rubio suggest that if other courts
attempt to apply Harden'sanalysis then the results will be inconsistent.
IV. Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Harden is
significant because it is the only decision that has held a state antikickback statute unconstitutional. Furthermore, state anti-kickback laws
that either criminalize broader conduct than the federal law or that lack
219. Id.
220.

Rubio, 917 So. 2d at 392.

221.

Id. This holding, however, has since been reversed. See State v. Rubio, 34 Fla.

L. Weekly S 464 (Fla. July 12, 2007).
222. See Rubio, 917 So. 2d at 396.

223. Id. at 395.
224. Id.
225. See also State v. Rubio, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S 464 (Fla. July 12, 2007)
(proclaiming "the strong medicine of preemption was necessary in Harden because the
state statute criminalized activities expressly protected in the federal law").
226. See supra note 210.
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specific safe harbors are susceptible to the Harden court's preemption
analysis. While it remains to be seen exactly how persuasive other
courts will find the Harden decision, courts may use the Harden
framework to strike down state anti-kickback statutes in the near future.
In addition, state legislatures may look to the Harden decision and
amend their own anti-kickback statutes in an attempt to bring the statutes
more in line with the federal anti-kickback law.
Despite these
possibilities, strong arguments against preempting state Medicaid antikickback statutes exist and arguably undermine the Harden decision.
One argument against preempting state Medicaid anti-kickback statutes
is that the federal anti-kickback statute lacks any preemption provisions.
In addition, because the Medicaid program is implemented in large part
by the states, there should be a strong presumption against preemption,
particularly where a state legislature has decided to enact an antikickback statute that is stricter than the federal counterpart.
One significant issue discussed in the Harden decision is the fact
that courts remain split with regard to which mens rea standard to apply
to the federal anti-kickback statute. If the issue comes before the United
States Supreme Court, the Court should conclusively resolve this split in
favor of a uniform standard. The mens rea standard that the United
States Supreme Court applied in Bryan v. United States should be
extended to the federal anti-kickback statute because the Bryan standard
is consistent with the intermediate standard currently applied by the
majority of courts, and is compatible with the anti-kickback statute's
mens rea requirement "knowingly and willfully."
The Harden analysis will be difficult to apply to other state antikickback statutes as well as to healthcare fraud statutes generally. This
proposition is clearly demonstrated by examining decisions from the
Florida appellate courts that have interpreted Harden. Because of the
potential for inconsistent outcomes and the weaknesses in the Florida
Supreme Court's analysis, other state courts must be cautious in either
attempting to apply the Harden framework in preemption cases or in
holding state anti-kickback statutes unconstitutional. If states cannot
decide for themselves how to prosecute Medicaid fraud, then the entire
system will suffer.

